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An analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach with attention to 
her use of the term “threshold” 
 
Jonathan M. Spring, BPhil 
University of Pittsburgh 2008 
 
 
 This paper investigates Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, which is influential in 
current political philosophy and policy making.  The capabilities approach is contextualized 
within the scope of Nussbaum’s influences in section I.  These influences are primarily Aristotle, 
Kant, Marx, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen.  In section II her own view is explicated with 
attention to the influences previously described.  This section also attempts to clarify certain 
aspects of her view, such as her use of “person” and “human.”  This is in order to set the stage 
for section III, which critiques the various aspects of the approach which were explained in 
section II.  In general, the capabilities approach is found wanting, however there are some useful 
qualities that are unique to a capabilities approach to political philosophy, ethics, or economics.  
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Section I 
The question of what it is good for a person to do is one of the oldest questions in western 
philosophy.  Closely linked to this question is the question of what it is good for a group of 
people, either socially or politically, to do.  Some approaches to political philosophy make use of 
moral philosophy in order to justify their political claims, and others derive their political force 
with minimal reference to individual ethics.  This paper shall consider the contemporary thinker 
Martha Nussbaum, who develops an answer for the political question via the moral idea that each 
human being is entitled to the development of her inherent capabilities in Women and Human 
Development.  This paper investigates Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach,” with attention to the 
manner in which Nussbaum measures the capabilities, namely, thresholds.  This section 
addresses the background of Nussbaum’s approach and the intellectual history of her ideas.  It 
examines the thinkers who have influenced her and the assumptions she accepts, whether 
implicitly or explicitly.   
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and the list of the central human capabilities that she 
generates, for the first time, in Women and Human Development are important for several 
reasons.  The approach has been expanded subsequently, primarily in her newer book Frontiers 
of Justice.  Given that all of the significant pieces of the approach are present and outlined in the 
first book more concisely, I choose to work from Women and Human Development as a starting 
point.  All of the main philosophical concepts of the capabilities approach are contained and 
outlined within Women and Human Development. Some ideas are developed more in depth and 
clarified within Frontiers of Justice, particularly by contrast to John Rawls’s view, which makes 
that book a valuable resource when the other seems insufficient.  Nussbaum’s whole work with 
capabilities is a meaningful addition to an influential current in 
sociopolitical/economic/philosophical thought.  The contractualist tradition has become the 
prevailing political philosophy since utilitarianism is now mostly defunct, and Nussbaum brings 
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new insight into that tradition through her interpretations via both Aristotle and welfare 
economics. 
 The contractualist tradition, beginning with Hobbes and continuing through Rawls, is the 
prevailing tradition from which this current of thought grew.  Women and Human Development 
is some of the fruit of the research that Nussbaum and Sen conducted at the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (WIDER) from 1986.  This work produced the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which has rivaled GNP as the World Bank’s preferred measure of 
national functioning since its inception in 1993 (WHD 70).  Sen’s continuing insistence that the 
ethical needs to be reinstated into the economic tradition, a major motivation behind the HDI, 
won him the Nobel Prize in economics in 1998 for “his contributions to welfare economics” 
(Nobel Foundation).  Nussbaum’s elaboration of her capabilities approach is in many ways an 
elaboration of Sen’s discussion of capabilities. This elaboration would allow governments to 
legislate and debate about capabilities in a specific way useful for policy making.  Sen, for all his 
contributions to the field, had not developed a specific list of the capabilities.  Such a list is vital 
if politicians want to be able to discuss human capability in their policy.  This is because “human 
capability” is too broad a basis to ground legislation, but specific areas such as “bodily health” 
might be politically manageable, given some simple delineation.   
Nussbaum is a preeminent scholar on the works of Aristotle and often works from an 
Aristotelian framework (Curriculum Vitae).  As a philosopher, she is attempting to ground this 
capabilities approach and its political consequences in firm philosophical fundamentals.  Women 
and Human Development is not the full development of this approach; rather, it is a major step in 
a long process of justifying capabilities as a source of policy and justifying them within a 
sensible philosophical framework (WHD xiii-xiv).  In Frontiers of Justice, the capabilities 
approach remains far from a complete theory of justice. However, this book does help clarify the 
approach’s relationship to various authors, both in and related to the contractualist tradition, as 
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well as defend the approach’s use of certain bases such as intuition.  If this project were to 
succeed, then we might secure what may be the foremost goal of political philosophy today: a 
series of sound arguments going from first principles to national policy.  This is an enormous 
project, but Nussbaum’s thoughts may lead us a little bit closer to this complete project. 
In addition to Aristotle, the major influences on Nussbaum’s capabilities approach are 
Karl Marx, Immanuel Kant, Amartya Sen, and John Rawls.  Nussbaum’s work is, in many ways, 
a unique synthesis of these thinkers.  It is useful to start off by generalizing and characterizing 
each thinker’s influence on Nussbaum’s writing.  In order to focus the argument within this 
paper, much of the thought emanating from these sources will not be critically discussed.  These 
ideas are not foregone conclusions, but they do enjoy wide acceptance.  Knowledge of these 
ideas is instructive because in order to know where a line of thought is going, it is helpful to 
understand the academic history of the view and its proponents.   
Nussbaum probably knows Aristotle’s work more thoroughly than she knows that of any 
of her other influences.  Her PhD topic at Harvard was classical philology.  Several of her 
articles, particularly earlier ones, are on elements of classic philosophy; her first three job titles 
all included “philosophy and classics” and the BBC even recruited her to speak on Aristotle in a 
documentary (Curriculum vitae).  She is committed to his ideas and she takes several tenets of 
her own work from his tenets.  Nussbaum, like Aristotle, maintains that there is something noble 
about the human, although they differ about what is noble about us and what we ought to do 
about it (WHD 73).  Aristotle also wrote that it is our rationality that distinguishes us from other 
animals, and it is our “function” or “task” as humans to act rationally and in accordance with 
virtue.  His conception of happiness is that it is only achieved by doing things in this manner, 
contrary to the view that happiness is a static state (Kraut section 2).  From this Aristotle drew 
his description of the good life and happiness.  Nussbaum retains the emphasis that he puts on 
rationality as central being human.  She states that she understands the term “fully human way,” 
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a phrase from Marx, to be a way “infused by practical reason…” (WHD 72).  Later, she claims 
that practical reason, along with sociability, “both organize and suffuse” her list of capabilities 
(WHD 82).  These two assumptions, about human dignity and rationality, may be simple, but 
they are deeply ingrained in Nussbaum’s writing.   
While Aristotle is notable for the origin of tenets held deeply by Nussbaum, Marx is 
notable for his interpretation and coloring of another source, to wit, Aristotle.  What Nussbaum 
identifies as Marx’s interpretation of Aristotle is that there is something unique and distinctive in 
the way that a human undertakes certain actions.  This way is the “truly human way,” described 
above, contrasted with a “merely animal way” of acting.  This account is an expansion on 
Aristotle’s idea that rationality is central to what it is to be human. Nussbaum goes on from Marx 
to include that these actions or functions often mark the presence or absence of human life by 
their own presence or absence (WHD 72).  Marx also shifts emphasis on the essential 
characteristics of a human.  In Economic Manuscripts of 1844 he writes “the individual is the 
social being.  The expression of his life…is therefore an expression and assertion of social life” 
(Wessell Jr. 194).  
Marx is not alone in this identification of the human as an inherently social and dignified 
creature, nor is he first.  Nussbaum also finds this within the natural law theory of Hugo Grotius.  
Although Nussbaum is attempting to revive Grotius in the realm of international relations (FJ 
36), the underpinnings of Nussbaum’s thought seem to come from Marx.  Marx contrasts what it 
is to be human with the animal, claiming that human functioning is somehow higher.  Marx 
captures his idea of animal-like functioning with his example of a starving man, again in the 
Economic Manuscripts, “[food] could be available in its crudest form and one could not say 
wherein the starving man’s eating differs from that of animals.”  In the previous sentence, Marx 
claims that food would not even exist in its “human” form for the starving man (Wessel Jr. 197).  
This example is meant to capture the qualitative difference between the functioning of a man 
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who is starving and the functioning of one who is well fed.  Marx was writing this with the 
starving proletarian in mind.  For Nussbaum, Marx saw the human being who was without 
sufficient food or means to it as denied the dignity inherent in being human. It is more likely that 
Marx realized how needs shaped one’s conception of reality.  Regardless, the proletarian was 
reduced to acting in a subhuman, or less than human, manner because of the constant disability 
of hunger.  The analogy here is easy: where Marx saw the suffering proletarian, Nussbaum sees 
the suffering Indian (woman).  Nussbaum interprets the notion of the human form of food, or 
human form of any task, as a form “infused by practical reasoning and sociability,” as noted 
above (WHD 72).  Nussbaum is closely in step with Marx in her emphasis on sociability, putting 
it on equal importance with practical reasoning in understanding the human condition.   
Kant, like Aristotle, left a large body of work which spawned a vast body of work 
responding to it.  Kant’s ethics settle around his Categorical Imperative.  The roots here are 
imperative as a command and categorical in that it applies universally.  Kant’s Imperative 
applies across rational wills, which he assumes includes primarily people. Therefore the 
Imperative bears on what we should or should not do (Johnson section 4).  The Imperative 
actually has several formulations, but the relevant one is the “Kingdom of Ends” formulation.  
This formulation is marked by three characteristics: (i) that we conform our actions to laws laid 
down by a legislator, (ii) that these laws are universal in scope, applying to all rational wills, and 
(iii) the laws are such that it is possible for each and every will to have been their legislator.  
Since each will ought to be treated as a legislator of binding laws, it continues, each will ought to 
be treated as an end in itself (Johnson section 8).  This conclusion is what Nussbaum latches on 
to.  Her primary principle, that of “each person’s capability,” is based upon her “principle of 
each person as an end,” which is a principle derived from this version of the Imperative and 
actually underwrites and supports what one might think was her fundamental claim, that of each 
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person’s capabilities (WHD 5).  This is the case even though nowhere does she offer a 
justification for the principle of each person as an end nor for the Categorical Imperative. 
Kant’s disposition towards agency, his own view indebted to Rousseau, is also relevant to 
Nussbaum’s endeavors.  In general, Kant held that “human dignity requires humans to make 
[their own laws].” This topic is addressed in the 1784 essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What 
is the Enlightenment?’” (From Modernism to Postmodernism 45).  The idea that human dignity 
requires agency plays a hardy role in the capabilities approach.  Kant figures significantly in the 
contractualist tradition, although he is part of a different branch of it than Rawls.  In addition to 
the above similarity, Nussbaum’s perceives that Kantian contractualism includes moral 
judgments within it from the beginning, unlike Rawls’s Theory of Justice.  For these reasons 
Nussbaum considers Kantian forms of the contractarian tradition to be especially close allies of 
her capabilities approach (FJ 95).  Like Kant, Amartya Sen also puts significant emphasis on 
agency, for Sen treats it as an intrinsic good, or a good in itself (Sen 1987 p.41). 
One ought not underestimate the influence of Amartya Sen on the capabilities approach.  
One may think this difficult, since Nussbaum devotes four pages of the introduction to which 
aspects are and are not common between their respective approaches, a fact that in itself 
indicates a deep interconnectedness (WHD 11-15).  Sen was developing his own ideas about 
measuring economic development through capability development when the two thinkers began 
collaborating at WIDER in 1986 (WHD 11).  This institute is a branch of the United Nations, 
and a version of a capabilities approach would continue to influence the UN as the underlying 
principle of the Human Development Reports and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), as well as the influential HDI (WHD 70).  Nussbaum notes no end date to their 
collaboration, and presumably it continued for the 14 years until the publishing of Women and 
Human Development.  Notably, this publication in March 2000 was only six months after Sen’s 
publication of his work explicating capabilities within his economic development approach, 
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Development as Freedom.  It seems that they each became satisfied with their capabilities 
approach at about the same time, suggesting close contact throughout those 14 years.   
Sen holds several views relevant to the discussion of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.  
Sen wants to bring ethics back into economics, and employs a form of capabilities to do so.  Sen 
has held for some time that this loss of ethics is a loss for which economics suffers (Sen 1-2, 5).  
He also holds the converse, that “there is something to be gained for ethics from reasonings of 
the type much used in economics” (Sen 10).  Given their extensive collaboration, Nussbaum’s 
work in ethics seems a likely place to find this influence of economist-like reasoning.  Sen has 
also argued that there is an irreducible tension in the ethical conception of a person.  This tension 
is between measuring that person in terms of her agency, “recognizing and respecting his or her 
ability to form goals, commitments, values, etc.,” and in terms of her well-being, which may 
often be related to a utility function (happiness or desire-satisfaction) in economics (Sen 41).   
This desire to maintain two independent axes by which to judge a person ethically is also 
found in Nussbaum, even though she denies the terminology that Sen employs, “agency” and 
“well being” (WHD 14).  It is this desire that may plausibly be driving her critique of both 
“subjective welfarism” and “platonism,” each of which only utilizes one of the two axes that Sen 
maintains.  Furthermore, her conclusion is that her capabilities approach achieves a valuable 
synthesis of, or “mean between,” the two; she includes both independent axes of judgment in it 
(WHD 116-119).  This set of critiques will be addressed later; for now suffice it to say that each 
depends on one axis of evaluation.  Whatever else may be said of Sen’s role in Nussbaum’s 
work, she summarizes his influence on her work best herself, in her acknowledgements: “Above 
all I am grateful to Amartya Sen, who helped to formulate the project, and whose work has been, 
and continues to be, a source of insight and inspiration” (WHD xvi). 
Within the families of philosophical traditions, Rawls’s contractualist theory is most 
directly the progenitor of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.  Her capabilities approach “follows 
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and extends” Rawls’s theory in many respects (FJ 94).  Nussbaum is using several terms, such as 
“political liberalism,” “theory of justice,” and “overlapping consensus,” exactly as Rawls defines 
them.  An overlapping consensus is a political agreement that can be arrived to and agreed upon 
even by people who have fundamentally conflicting views about the basis of political goals, such 
as religious or moral views (Rawls 1993 p.133-168).  According to Rawls, such a consensus 
requires different reasonable doctrines to each “endorse the political conception, each from its 
own point of view.  Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception” (Rawls 
134).  Thus, without an overlapping consensus Rawls does not believe that society can be stable.  
Additionally, Rawls claims that in a consensus it is society’s politically active citizens who 
confirm the doctrine and that “the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with 
citizens’ [preformed] essential interests” (134).  The idea of an overlapping consensus is 
particularly important because Nussbaum believes that the capabilities approach can be the 
object of a worldwide overlapping consensus; thus it is a fair guide to policy (WHD 5).  We shall 
return to the concept of an overlapping consensus and its interaction with the capabilities 
approach in section III.   
Rawls notes that he is using the term “political liberalism” in a way peculiar to what may 
be its common meaning. By political liberalism he means a particular understanding of what a 
constitutional democracy ought to be, namely a society structured by justice, the conception of 
which is the subject of an overlapping consensus among differing reasonable doctrines, and 
which guides public discussion on essential issues (p.1, 43-46).  A theory of justice is a complete 
normative theory about what is fair for an institution or government to require of its citizens, 
including the interaction between citizens.  A key feature of Rawls’ theory of justice that 
Nussbaum relates to her capabilities approach is Rawls’s conception of primary goods.  Primary 
goods are supposed to be the things that every rational man would want to have, no matter what 
his plan for life is, because these primary goods are required to execute any plan that the rational 
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man could have (Rawls 1971 p.62).  It is a fair distribution of these goods that a political society 
can form and act on, and this basically determines whether a government is just or not.  Rawls’s 
primary goods are of three primary types: basic rights and liberties, typically such as those 
covered in the Bill of Rights; non-basic rights such as political or social power and positions; and 
thirdly wealth and income (Noggle).  Rawls also discusses self-respect as a primary good, and 
suggests that it may be the most important one (Rawls 1971 p.440).  He may be including self-
respect loosely within the first broad group of rights and liberties, but his treatment of it makes it 
seem that it is within its own category.   
This is important because Nussbaum’s list of capabilities may be seen as a modification 
of Rawls’ list of primary goods.  She notes that the list of central human capabilities is similar, 
partially in substance and particularly in spirit, to the list of the primary goods.  There are some 
important differences between the two lists, however.  Nussbaum notes two: that her list is one of 
capabilities rather than functions (differentiated in section II), and that her list protects a person’s 
ability to pursue what they themselves value outside the list (WHD 74).  Nussbaum later claims 
that the primary goods are reducible to terms of income and wealth alone, since Rawls insists on 
measuring “relative social positions in a precise way, by appeal to income and wealth alone – a 
part of his theory that causes large difficulties” (FJ 84).  If this reduction does exist, it must exist 
only in our assessment of the primary goods, because Rawls is explicit in that citizens may not 
exchange their basic liberties for economic gains.  In this sense, the two types of goods are 
qualitatively distinct (TJ 62-63).  Such a reduction in Rawls’s list would make the qualitative 
distinctness murky; her capabilities are claimed to maintain this distinctness not only of 
goods/capabilities but of their assessment.   
It is not clear that this reduction exists in Rawls; Nussbaum’s claim of reduction is 
possibly based on a couple of simplifications Rawls makes.  Firstly, the manner in which we 
measure political and social power may be reduced to a measure of wealth and income, since 
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power is elusive to measure and wealth is a good approximation of power.  Secondly, one might 
imagine approximating basic rights and liberties on a basis of social power.  This approximation 
does not seem as plausible as the first, but the other argument is that basic rights are supposed to 
be equally distributed to all citizens. Indeed, all the primary goods are to be distributed fairly, 
especially since in real cases they are scarce.  “Fairly,” here, means that all the primary goods 
must be distributed equally unless a distribution that is unequal benefits everyone involved 
(Rawls 1971 p.62).  However to distribute the basic rights and liberties fairly everyone is entitled 
to each liberty in equal proportion.  If this were the case, then one would not need to measure or 
quantify them, a task which would prove difficult anyway.  For this reason Rawls does not 
attempt to measure the first primary goods (rights and liberties), and the second (social and 
political power) are reducible to income, a very easy thing to measure.  Rawls does, however, 
serially order the primary goods, such that no amount of increased economic success could 
justify a forfeiture of basic rights (Rawls p.63).  This serial ordering is a conception of politics 
that Nussbaum incorporates into her view, however for her it is the capabilities that cannot be 
sacrificed for money. 
Although Nussbaum, like Rawls, incorporates the importance of basic liberties 
(capabilities) over economic advantage, she makes the question of distribution secondary in the 
capabilities approach. This change is contrary to Rawls’s emphasis on the fairness of 
distribution, for that is central to his concept of justice as fairness.  Within the capabilities 
approach, we are primarily concerned with the individual and her flourishing via capabilities.  
The capabilities approach in itself, although an incomplete theory of justice, makes no motion to 
require that each person be entitled to an equal portion of anything, just so long as everyone 
would have enough to be considered flourishing.  Nussbaum is certainly sympathetic to a more 
nearly equal distribution of wealth and resources, and in some cases Nussbaum proceeds to argue 
that equal distribution may be requisite for everyone to reach the threshold of a certain 
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capability, such as in the case of being treated with dignity and respect (FJ 292).  While this 
conclusion is a happy convergence, in Nussbaum’s opinion, it is a convergence from different 
approaches.  It may later be important for Nussbaum to discuss the fair distribution of limited 
resources in promoting the realization of these capabilities within a community or fair 
distribution among citizens who are all above the threshold, but she is concerned first with 
establishing human capability and flourishing, i.e. everyone living at or above the threshold of 
her capabilities, as something we ought to care about.  It is perhaps because of this consideration 
that the capabilities approach is not to be considered “a complete theory of justice” (WHD 75).    
Both the list of central human capabilities and the list of primary goods are offered in the 
“political-liberal spirit.”  Such a spirit is one with political purposes, offering a moral basis for 
constitutional guarantees, and appeals to people with widely different views on “what a complete 
good life for a human being would be” (WHD 74).  Such a spirit is closely linked to wanting an 
overlapping consensus, and derives from the ideal formulation of a liberal constitutional 
democracy.  Nussbaum’s formulation of the capabilities approach, which allows for “multiple 
realizability,” facilitates its role as an overlapping consensus by easing the acceptance of the 
approach by people who hold different comprehensive doctrines.  Most comprehensive doctrines 
will have different views from others on what it is good for a human being to be and why, but the 
capabilities approach aims to be compatible with all of them.   
The statements below are, in no particular order, ones that Nussbaum accepts and that 
this paper will not critically examine.  Each has been disputed, with varying efficacy, in the past, 
but they have stood the test of time reasonably well.  These are distilled here from the discussion 
above; all are consistent within their own traditions.  The potential does exist, however, that each 
of these ideas is internally consistent within its own system of thought but that Nussbaum’s 
synthesis brings about inconsistencies in her view.  The simplest way for such inconsistencies to 
arise would be if Nussbaum did not accept some of the premises necessary for the support of one 
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of these ideas, but there could be more complex interactions.  Such possibilities will be 
addressed in section III. 
(1) There is something special about a human being, and this entitles her to a life of 
dignity.   
(2) The key characteristics of a human being are her rationality, sociability, and political 
relationships.  In Women and Human Development Nussbaum emphasizes the first two without 
mentioning the third, while in Frontiers of Justice she downplays the importance of rationality 
and substitutes that the human being is inherently social/political (FJ 85).  For the sake of 
inclusiveness, all three will be assumed, although the assumptions within the earlier book 
(rationality, sociability) have the greater historical backing.   
(3) A liberal democracy is the best form of human government.   
(4) A human’s agency, or ability to affect her situation and freedom to choose, is equally 
important to the moral evaluation of her situation as is her state of well being.  These two 
considerations are not commensurate and both are valuable independently.  This importance 
presumes that free choice actually exists, also. 
 (5) An individual, person, or human must be treated as an end in herself, and never as a 
mere means to another end.   
(6) An overlapping consensus between people within a nation about basic political 
principles, such that might compose a just constitution, is possible and meaningful.  Such a 
consensus is also useful among and between nations.   
All of this being said about Nussbaum’s influences and assumptions, we are now in a 
position to actually discuss Nussbaum’s view.  As mentioned at the beginning, this paper focuses 
itself through the lens of how Nussbaum assesses her capabilities, to wit, thresholds.  In order to 
ease into the discussion, Nussbaum’s concept of “flourishing” needs to be introduced.  Next, the 
groups of individuals to whom Nussbaum’s capabilities apply to shall also need consideration.  
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Here a discussion of the distinction between the terms “human” and “person” is useful, as well as 
one of the spheres or circles which Nussbaum envisions.  After that, Nussbaum’s distinction 
between capability and function can be discussed.  Additionally, a discussion of tragedy is 
important.  Also, a model of threshold, adopted from neuroscience, is instructive.  Following the 
current version of the list of capabilities, some of the prominent features of the list as a whole 
shall be presented.  All of these discussions are contained within section II.  Section III will work 
to identify some serious tensions or problems that exist within the work. 
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Section II 
According to Nussbaum, crossing the threshold of each and every capability ought to be 
achieved for each human being.  “Crossing the threshold” in this sentence might evoke images of 
passing through a doorway, which isn’t entirely off base.  Before you cross the threshold of a 
house, you are outside it, and after crossing the threshold you are inside, and there is not much of 
a grey area in between.   This is an approximate metaphor, but a more in depth metaphor shall be 
developed in the following paragraphs.  But before the discussion of thresholds themselves may 
be undertaken there is much groundwork that must be prepared.  These topics are: the term 
“flourishing;” the distinction between the terms “human” and “person;” Nussbaum’s goal of 
“capability,” as opposed to “functioning;” the importance of the concept of tragedy to the 
capabilities approach; and the list of capabilities that Nussbaum proposes, as well as some 
features of the list.   
One possible explanation as to why Nussbaum employs thresholds is that they help her to 
capture the qualitative difference between a person who is deprived or “animal-like” and a 
person who exemplifies human virtue.  These two states lie somewhat distant from each other on 
the continuum of human existences.  It is not particularly easy to identify exactly the point at 
which a dignified person becomes an animal, but there does seem to be a real, qualitative 
difference between these two ways of existing.  Nussbaum’s thresholds are meant to designate 
the point at which a person transitions between this underserved, animal-like state and the 
dignified, appropriately human state in each area that is considered central to human functioning.   
If a human is at or above threshold in all of these areas, of which Nussbaum posits ten, 
then she is “flourishing.”  A flourishing human is not perfect or ideal, but thriving, successful, 
prospering, or faring well. A flourishing citizen will exhibit all of the functions that one might 
judge to be central to “truly human functioning.”  Citizens that are flourishing “have been judged 
to be worthy of respect and wonder” (FJ 347) and “certain basic aspirations to human flourishing 
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are recognizable across differences of class and context” (WHD 31) even though the specifics of 
what one culture might consider flourishing may vary with another culture’s specific conception.  
Allowing variation is a departure from Aristotle’s normative theory, in which there was a 
singular conception of flourishing to aspire to.  This departure is a result of the political nature of 
the approach, for in order to be more acceptable as an overlapping consensus among citizens 
with different metaphysical views Nussbaum’s conception of flourishing, and the capabilities 
that that describe it, is “explicitly nonmetaphysical” (FJ 182). 
The capabilities approach intimately deals with the idea of what it is good for citizens to 
do.  Nussbaum considers what governments ought to encourage, allow, and deny their citizens to 
do, which is an extension of what it is good for those citizens to do.  There is not a one-to-one 
correspondence between what a person or a human ought to do and what a government ought to 
require or permit its citizens to do since special considerations arise with the collectivization of 
individuals, but the two are closely related.  Restating Nussbaum’s position, the goal of a 
government should be to enable every individual citizen to flourish. Nussbaum is concerned not 
only with the capabilities of humans but also with the capabilities of persons.  Therefore, there is 
one clarificatory distinction that should be made before continuing.  Since ethics is concerned 
with what one ought to do, it is important to clarify exactly what one is.  This is why it shall be 
instructive to distinguish between the terms “human” and “person,” as they may take on different 
senses.  Note that in the previous paragraph the goal of Nussbaum’s ethic is described in terms of 
citizens.  Consider, however, whether the important characteristic of a citizen is that she is a 
person, or that she is a human. This is not a distinction that Nussbaum makes explicitly, which is 
unfortunate because she seems to conflate the two terms occasionally.   
But let’s get the horse back in front of the cart, and make a distinction between “human” 
and “person.”  In this paper, the terms “human being” or “human” shall be used by the author to 
signify a member of the biological species Homo sapiens sapiens.  Using “human” to indicate 
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exclusively human life is not to say that “human” is a bland term; a member of this particular 
species may possess certain key properties, privileges, rights, duties, or goals.  For example, one 
might hold that as a human one ought to aspire to be virtuous.  A person also has distinct 
properties.  However, pinning down what a person is is more difficult, because “person” is not a 
biological category (species are in fact not constant, but they are more easily defined) but rather 
a slippery term foremost about a mind, however embodied.  One definition could identify 
persons with moral agents, or things that can be held accountable for what they have done.  This 
connection of personhood to responsibility for actions, and thus normative claims, was first 
proposed by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Shoemaker section 1).   
Locke also identified a person by its constant series of memories (Locke II.xxvii.12-26). A 
person could also be considered a conscious entity that is concerned for its well-being.  Although 
Lucretius and Plato each considered how to identify a person and what comprised a person, they 
both held this view connecting personhood with prudence (Shoemaker section 1).  It is also a 
general tenet of modern considerations of personhood that a person persists through time, and 
thus also has a certain history (Shoemaker intro).  This family of definitions aligns closely 
enough with what we mean when we say, “I talked to a person today.”   
Importantly, though, a human being need not be a person and a person need not be a 
human being.  Although in the world we currently know a person is usually a human, it has been 
maintained that corporations are legally persons.  Corporations have been granted the protections 
of the equal protection under the law and due process of law clauses (in the 14th amendment), 
which hold that no “person” shall be denied these rights (Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc.).  
It may also be argued that some humans are not persons.  Nussbaum notes this argument is often 
made within medical ethics, regarding judgments of mental damage severe enough to render the 
patient no longer be judged a person (WHD 73).  For example, such considerations often justify 
discontinuing life support, on the grounds that it is the right of a person, as opposed to a human, 
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to live.  A nonhuman person is also imaginable: consider Data from Star Trek, or any other 
android.  When Data is injured, we feel for it, nay, him, just as we feel for any human person.  
This thought experiment may be less fantastical than it might appear, as computer science 
continues to advance, but the situation is not immanent.  Intelligent machines would certainly 
throw ethics for a loop, but so would other nonhuman entities that plenty of people consider to 
exist, such as angels.  Regardless, if we disassociate personhood from human being, ethics may 
be better able to cope with these other entities.   However the real point, for this discussion 
anyway, is to avoid conflation in Nussbaum’s account of what capabilities and thresholds apply 
to whom and why.   
This task of disentangling is made more difficult by the fact that Nussbaum does not 
make this distinction in her work, and sometimes the distinction matters for interpreting her work 
and her quotations.  When she is talking about “truly human functioning” it is not clear whether 
she actually has a person or a human in mind as the entity that is functioning in such a way.  She 
comments that certain human beings may be so mentally impaired as to not count as “human” 
within her approach (WHD 73), although is obviously not possible for a human being to lose her 
membership in the human species by being excessively senile.  Here it seems clear she means 
person.  She also states that the basis for a “person’s” claim to be treated justly in Nussbaum’s 
approach is her existence as a “human being” (FJ 285). However, she simultaneously holds that 
in order to grant nonhuman animals a claim to justice that they could be considered “persons,” 
albeit in an extended sense (FJ 63).  The relationship between humans and other animals had not 
previously been one of justice (TJ 505).  Nussbaum also wants to expand the scope of justice to 
those humans who especially lack capacity such as the disabled or those in foreign countries, 
who are often forgotten.  She is hoping to demonstrate that nonhuman animals and these other 
groups can be treated through the considerations of justice that were previously reserved for 
healthy men of individual nations (FJ 22).   
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An effort shall be made to keep the terms distinct and make her meaning clear, and if 
there is particularly good reason to replace one word in a quotation with another that replacement 
shall be explicitly noted.  Nussbaum explicitly states that what grants a claim to one’s 
development of one’s capabilities is existence as a human being, i.e. a member of the biological 
species.  Therefore the preferred word in this paper in rendering Nussbaum’s work is “human,” 
not “person,” since it seems that for better or worse humanity, not personhood, is the key 
attribute that determines whether the capabilities approach applies to an entity.  Also, “citizen” is 
used without special meaning in situations where the person-human distinction might be 
distracting and we are simply talking about individuals within a government.  We will leave 
aside critical discussion of Nussbaum’s treatment of nonhuman animals since her thought in the 
area could benefit from much fuller explanation, and it is outside our central concern of the 
central human capabilities and their assessment via thresholds. 
A distinction that Nussbaum holds to be important is that between capability and 
functioning.  There is an intimate relationship between the two concepts, but they are importantly 
distinct.  Note the difference between a person voting, and exercising her function to vote, and a 
person being fully able to vote but deciding not to.  Both of these instances are very different 
from, say, African Americans under Jim Crow.  Those humans actually didn’t have the real 
capability to vote, due to several institutional and societal barriers.  Nussbaum’s point is that 
citizens must have the capability to act above a certain threshold, but not actually be forced to do 
so.  This emphasis is in order to preserve a person’s capability to plan her own life, which is 
itself a reference to the good of agency.  Sen has argued that agency is intrinsically desirable, and 
it seems that Nussbaum would agree (Sen 41-42).  She states that “the reason for proceeding in 
this way [requiring capability rather than function] is, quite simply, the respect we have for 
people and their choices” (WHD 88).  It also is meant to help in avoiding paternalism, which is 
related to agency, and a topic which I shall discuss later in this section. 
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 The emphasis on capability as opposed to function is intended to capture the difference 
between fasting and starving, which is an explicit reference to Marx’s archetypical example.  
One may choose to fast, and this is fine, Nussbaum says, since one who fasts has the capability 
to eat.  One may not choose to starve, however, and a starving human is not what a human ought 
to be (WHD 72).  This distinction seems to come down to the high value that Nussbaum, like 
several of her forebears, ascribe to free choice.  Indeed, a reasonable definition of fasting might 
simply be ‘choosing to starve.’  But as long as the individual has the choice, the real choice, to 
realize her capability but chooses not to, no injustice is done, in Nussbaum’s opinion.  This 
distinction is supposed to be analogous to other specific capabilities as well.  For example, a 
lawyer in the US may choose to work a 110-hour week and forgo play.  However, a woman in 
China, who is without legal protections on the length of a workday or minimum wage, but also 
needs to earn a living, cannot choose whether or not she will work seven days a week and 14 
hours a day because those are the conditions of the only jobs available to many citizens.  She 
either works that schedule or works none at all, and starves.  There are several other 
considerations that might go into the injustice of such working conditions, but this time 
commitment is intricately connected to the dearth of social and emotional connections the 
workers make, their limited ability to associate with others and to play (Wal-Mart: the High Cost 
of Low Prices).  This example highlights the interconnectedness of the capabilities of an 
individual, and that although each is uniquely important in its own right for human flourishing, 
each influences every other. 
Nussbaum’s conception of capabilities is one of the “central human capabilities” (WHD 
5).  These capabilities are human exactly in the sense that rationality was human to Aristotle, 
namely that they are intrinsic to us as human beings.  So the citizens to whom Nussbaum’s 
approach applies are to be thought of as human primarily.  Her use of “person,” such as her 
principle of “each person’s capability,” is probably better read as a principle of each individual’s 
Spring - 25 - 
 
 
or each human’s capability; person seems to be substituted with its informal meaning (WHD 74).  
Regardless, this distinction will still establish a tension between the foundations that Nussbaum 
finds in Aristotle and those she finds in Kant, which will be discussed in the following section. 
 Tragedy and what is considered tragic is important to Nussbaum’s approach for two 
reasons.  First, by reflecting on what may be considered tragic we can identify what capabilities 
are central to human function by their absence; Nussbaum considers tragic events to often 
highlight areas in which a human is denied the life she is worthy of.  Secondly, a sense of 
tragedy is necessary in order to identify the specific levels of each of these capabilities at which a 
person is to be considered flourishing. 
 Nussbaum’s sense of tragedy is loosely based on Aristotle’s that is forwarded in his 
Poetics.  Aristotle’s account is much more specific, applying only to the one sort of play or 
poem; tragedy is opposed to comedy, and those are the two ancient classifications.  Nussbaum is 
also seeking sources of tragedy within literature, so her expanded sense of it may just be due to 
the fact that she has a much richer canon from which to choose.  In the Poetics, Aristotle 
explains that tragedy is marked only by “pity and fear,” pity being that which is “aroused by 
unmerited misfortune” and fear the emotion that is aroused “by the misfortune of a man like 
ourselves” (Poetics 7.2).  This is not just any misfortune, but rather only misfortune that is 
“brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty” in the character we are 
observing (7.2).  The tragic character does not deserve her fate, for it is brought about by human 
error or weakness, yet she is denied something that the human audience observes to be a feature 
common to all of the audience.  This statement is what Nussbaum’s concept echoes in her 
modern language.  She holds that “certain deprivations are understood to be terrible” no matter 
the culture that experiences the tragic plot (WHD 74).  Nussbaum believes that the list of central 
human capabilities can be listed at all because she senses the cross-cultural consistency of certain 
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deprivations that evoke pity and fear, i.e. a sense of tragedy a la Aristotle, whenever those 
deprivations are observed (WHD 74). 
 For an illumination of what in particular is tragic Nussbaum might have us turn to the 
vast accumulation of literary and mythological characters whose experiences evoke feelings of 
loss and tragedy as we involve ourselves in their stories.  She herself recounts two, more 
personal, tales: those of Vasanti and Jayamma, “two women trying to flourish” in different parts 
of India (WHD 15-24).  It is through their narratives that Nussbaum continually attempts to 
communicate to her reader what her sense of tragedy is and in the assumption that our sense of 
tragedy will align.  Like any other tragic stories and tales, these are supposed to contain a broad, 
cross-cultural appeal to which all citizens could agree.  Indian, Japanese and English citizens are 
all supposed to find both Othello and the 47 ronin just as tragic as each other.  Additionally, we 
are all also supposedly able to make judgments about when someone is flourishing or not.  
Nussbaum does not spend much time on this positive identification of flourishing, but it is the 
lack of this positive sense that lets observers know something is not right in the first place.  
Nussbaum must think this topic a rather simple case, for she spends hardly any time on tragedy 
and the definition of it, even though she is basing her list of capabilities on the sense of 
deprivation and the emotions of pity and fear.  Whether there is actually a broad cross-cultural 
consensus about what different citizens find to be tragic and to arouse those emotions is an 
empirical matter that Nussbaum does not address.  Further, it is not clear if it is sufficient for a 
simple majority of citizens to deem certain situations tragic, or if everyone is needed to agree, or 
if there is some other percentage of agreement required.  It may also be that as long as everyone 
finds some things tragic Nussbaum may posit capabilities in the first place, and this is sufficient.  
Since the list of capabilities is plastic, as we shall see, as long as something can be identified by 
the sense of tragedy Nussbaum has some footing upon which to expand her idea that what we 
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ought to care about is human capability (in regards to what citizens and governments ought to 
do).  
 Now it is time to turn to the question about what it actually is that we humans “are 
actually able to do and to be” (WHD 5).  Unlike Sen and her other predecessors in the 
capabilities tradition, Nussbaum posits an actual list of the central human capabilities that should 
be measured to determine whether or not a human being is flourishing.  The list is explicitly 
plastic, however.  She is not so audacious as to presume she has the list perfect.  So while the 
general idea is of capabilities as the aspiration, i.e. what is important to a moral theory, exactly 
what the capabilities of a person are could be argued for or against (WHD 77).  The capabilities 
are intended to capture what a worthy human life would look like.  Humans are certainly possess 
more than the ten capabilities that are listed.  Nussbaum mentions the capability to be cruel as an 
example, for while humans certainly have the capability to be cruel it is not considered to be a 
capability central to the achievement of a fully human existence (WHD 83).  The capabilities on 
the list central human capabilities are generated by reflection on two sides of the same coin, 
human flourishing and human tragedy.  Reflection on a flourishing human life generates a 
positive list of what capabilities we have good reason for including in our list of central human 
capabilities because we can identify what capabilities are present in a human with such a life.  By 
reflecting on tragic circumstances we can derive what capabilities are central by their absence.   
The ten capabilities identified in Women and Human Development are essentially the 
same as those presented in Frontiers of Justice, the main title of each is the same but there are 
some minor adjustments made to the wording of the explanations of each capability.  Appendix i 
contains the 2000 version of the list with alterations notated.  The current (2006) form of the list 
is as follows:   
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or 
before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
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2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; being adequately 
nourished; to have adequate shelter.  
 
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries 
treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child 
sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproduction. 
 
4. Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, think, and 
reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and 
scientific training.  Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and 
producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth.  Being 
able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to 
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise.  Being able to have 
pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those 
who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve,  to experience 
longing, gratitude, and justified anger.  Not having one's emotional developing blighted by fear or 
anxiety.  (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be 
shown to be crucial in their development.) 
 
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for liberty of conscience 
and religious observance.)  
 
7. Affiliation.  
A.  Being able to live for and towards others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of 
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another.  (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such 
forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech).    
B.  Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.  This entails protections against 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, or national 
origin.   
 
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the 
world of nature.  
 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
 
10. Control over one's environment.  
A. Political: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having 
the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.  
B. Material: Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property 
rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with 
others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure.  In work, being able to work as a 
human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual 
recognition with other workers.  (FJ 76-78; for comparison WHD 78-80) 
 
There are several features of the list as a whole that Nussbaum establishes. Each capability must 
be satisfied in itself in order for a person to be considered flourishing.  In this sense the 
capabilities may be said to be independent of one another; more of one is not to be substituted for 
less of another, particularly if that reduction is to below threshold.  In another light, the 
capabilities can be seen to be extraordinarily interconnected; none of them can be satisfied 
independently of all the others.  Being properly educated will certainly aid in political 
participation, and being able to emotionally relate to others and to have an imagination will aid 
in play.   
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 It would also be possible to institute a hierarchy among the capabilities, claiming that a 
human’s capability to bodily health must be satisfied before her capability to affiliate could be 
satisfied.  Restated, one might think that bodily health, or integrity perhaps, is a necessary 
condition for the capability to affiliate.  Henry Shue has developed such an approach as regards 
to human rights, at least (Shue).  However this rigid ordering of importance is misleading in talk 
of capabilities, since all of the capabilities interact meaningfully with each other, and one is not 
more fundamental than any others (WHD 81).  Attaining capability above threshold in all ten of 
the capabilities is required for a human to be considered flourishing.  Practically, one may need 
to be fed first in order to concentrate on learning to read.  But both being healthy (fed) and being 
educated are equally requirements of human flourishing.  Nussbaum does highlight two of the 
capabilities as of particular importance, however, since they “organize and suffuse” the rest of 
the list.  These two are the capabilities to practical reason and affiliation.  This should not be at 
all surprising, given her commitment to Aristotle and Marx’s interpretation of him.   
Indicating that her approach applies to humans insufficiently specifies the targets of her 
approach because Nussbaum also must indicate over which humans her approach is intended to 
be applicable.  Nussbaum intends specification of where thresholds are crossed for the various 
capabilities to occur within two spheres.  The more inclusive sphere is to provide for a more 
general definition of the threshold levels of each of the capabilities.  This sphere is a universal 
sphere, and it is designed to allow Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to fulfill its role as a 
purported universal approach, whereby it must be able to judge any situation about justice or 
political efficacy.  Risking stating the obvious, a universal theory is one that applies to 
everything and so a universal ethic applies to everything that can have ethical considerations 
applied to it.  Nussbaum’s approach is expressly intended to be universal in scope, and she 
spends much of chapter one, in which the capabilities approach and list is found, defending 
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universal values from several critiques (WHD 34-59).  The chapter is, in fact, named “in defense 
of universal values.”   
Despite the universal nature of her approach, Nussbaum takes pains to emphasize that her 
approach has another sphere of specification.  There will be a multiplicity of these smaller 
spheres, but they are meant to be for the most part distinct from one another.  They may be 
thought of as domains of influence, which are often nation-states. Nussbaum emphasizes that the 
larger sphere is sufficiently general to allow for the existence of smaller spheres of specification.   
What she emphasizes is the “multiple realizability” of the capabilities approach.  This is again 
similar to Rawls’s approach.  For him, constitutional democracies were defined with reference to 
his theory of justice.  In this way the individual democracies were allowed to vary slightly as 
long as they were defined by the broader, more general theory, which effectively creates a 
situation of multiple realizability of his theory.  These smaller spheres of nation-states, or 
perhaps cultural blocs, act through constitutional mechanisms or other mechanisms that are 
deemed legitimate.  Nation-states would be free to specify threshold levels more precisely within 
their sphere, as well as the manners in which these levels are to be encouraged, reached, and 
secured.  This move is intended to preserve the cultural diversity that is found in the world while 
maintaining a system by which to make judgments about the state of humans in other cultures.  
As one can easily surmise, the existence of two spheres of specification in a universal account of 
ethics is itself a potentially destructive tension within the approach.  This tension will be handled 
with the others, in section III. 
 The final pertinent feature of the list is its intended “multiple realizability,” particularly as 
a defense against paternalism and a way to respect the agency of humans, which were mentioned 
briefly earlier.   By multiple realizability it is meant that different members of the list may be 
specified more concretely within different cultural traditions and still satisfy the general form of 
the capability (WHD 77).  This realization of the capabilities approach is intended to occur 
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within the smaller sphere of specification of the approach.  It may include particular, specific 
threshold levels or goals, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the various political or 
community programs that would be enacted in order to promote these levels.  For example, if 
one compares approaches in the capitalist United States and socialist France to facilitate their 
citizens in attaining their capability to be healthy one finds different sources of funding, liability 
rules, insurance plans, &c. However, as long as the citizens in both countries are above threshold 
(which is not currently the case) the difference in approach is irrelevant.   
This feature of the approach is one of Nussbaum’s defenses against paternalism and one 
way to facilitate or maintain cultural pluralism across the world.  Paternalism, simply, is a style 
of managing an institution or system in the manner of a father for his children. In a paternalistic 
system intrusive decisions are made that deny the subordinate members, like children, general 
authority, responsibilities, or rights.  This is also generally said of governments, which have the 
power to enforce these intrusive decisions, either by force of arms or even by the tyranny of the 
majority in a democracy.  Fears of paternalism could be presented in opposition to universal 
norms, insofar as such norms would not show the proper respect for the agency of the citizens of 
much of the world since the system tells people what they ought to value.   
Paternalism is seen to be distasteful by Nussbaum for several reasons, which are included 
in her rebuttal of the “argument from paternalism” (against universal norms). Most notably, a 
paternalistic system seems to remove a person’s freedom as an individual agent, which we know 
that Nussbaum values highly, and also the related responsibility as a democratic citizen (WHD 
51).  Such a system would also imply the pretentious presumption that its judgments are better 
than the judgments of all the individuals over which the system applies.  This is a particularly 
difficult claim on a global scale, since a paternalistic claim would insult many of the billions of 
people in the world.  Many claims of paternalism are lodged against Eurocentric or Western 
ethics that are attempting to prescribe duties and values to those in vastly different cultures. Any 
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societal power structure inherently removes the rights of its members to some extent.  This 
exchange is at the heart of the contractualist tradition.  A paternalism argument may also be 
indicating the problem as the manner in which the contract is arrived.  A contract into which 
each member enters willingly and agreeably is not objectionable, since each party has consented 
to give up her rights, rather than have them taken away by a father figure.  Furthermore, much of 
the good of these institutions is that they are potentially capable of protecting certain universal 
values that are seen as necessary for society, and particularly the minority, such as “religious 
toleration, associative freedoms, and other major liberties” (WHD 52).  Further discussion of 
paternalism shall be involved in the critiques of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in section III.     
Several of the above features rely on Nussbaum’s concept of threshold.  In order for 
“flourishing” to define a meaningfully different state of humanity some qualitative marker, such 
as thresholds, must be the measure of what’s important, which is capabilities in this case.  These 
are accounts of human flourishing, and so these thresholds are based on accounts of human 
beings and seem to apply to humans; persons may only be made relevant to this approach insofar 
as they are humans.  Thresholds need not always be functionally expressed, so long as the human 
is actually capable of expressing functioning above the threshold.  And some features of the list 
require certain properties out of these thresholds: each capability must have a distinct threshold 
individual from those of the other capabilities, the threshold must be sufficiently specific for the 
approach to be universal, yet the threshold must be sufficiently plastic for multiple realizability 
to be feasible.   
Despite the importance of the identification of threshold levels to her approach, 
Nussbaum leaves her thresholds widely unspecified and acknowledges that they will require 
specification (WHD 75).  She envisions much of the specification is going to be done by 
individual governments.  However, she is hesitant to offer even the roughest guidelines beyond 
examples of humans she considers to be wanting in regards to their capabilities and the 
Spring - 34 - 
 
 
insistence on the intuitive grasp of when a human isn’t capable of truly human functioning.  The 
task of specification seems difficult, if not insurmountable, but the continuum of human 
functioning may be like other continuums along which we specify qualitative change when there 
seems none.  At what point blue light becomes green light is unclear, and it is a human judgment 
that there is any real difference at all. The wavelengths of light make no qualitative change in 
going from blue to green; the light behaves the same regarding observations of physics, but there 
is a difference in the frequency of the wave.  Some may take this to mean that the distinction 
between blue and green is arbitrary and impossible to specify.  This does not make the 
distinction useless, however, as artists and interior designers make significant, informed 
decisions based on these arbitrary distinctions that make real differences in human interaction 
with the world.   
 Both the distinctions between blue and green and between flourishing and not are judged 
by persons, unlike the threshold where ice becomes water.  Here, the temperature is variable (in 
relation to pressure, &c.) at which the change occurs, but there is a distinctive qualitative change, 
from solid to liquid, at the threshold that is significant, i.e. you can stand on ice but not water.  If 
human capabilities have thresholds like water there should be an obvious outward change in the 
individual that does not rely on human observation.  Since the threshold that is distinguished is 
judged by persons the capabilities are more closely analogous to the way in which we judge 
colors of light, rather than the way water turns to ice.  In the case of capabilities, this is done by 
what is considered morally unacceptable or by tragedy, and in the case of light thresholds are 
determined by what we see. 
The concept of a threshold is technically expanded and systematically used in 
neuroscience.  It is not the only place that the concept of threshold is developed, and Nussbaum 
never acknowledges a connection with any prior conception of thresholds.  However, the 
analogy between neural thresholds and moral human thresholds may be helpful.  Since 
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Nussbaum doesn’t posit any specific of definition of thresholds, how they work, or what they are 
supposed to be, this analogy with neural thresholds can help shed light upon these basic 
questions such that we may better understand how Nussbaum envisions her capabilities approach 
to function.  The concept of threshold is integral to the model of the way in which neurons, the 
cells which make up the brain, spinal cord, and peripheral nervous system in animals, work.  
Figure 1 is a simple schematic of a neuron, for reference. 
  
Figure 1: www.virtualventures.ca/~neil/neural/neuron1.gif 
 Neuroscience’s model of neuron function is that neurons integrate multiple input signals 
into one simple response: either the neuron “fires” or it does not.  This integration occurs in the 
head, or soma, of the neuron.  Once a signal is fired from the axon hillock the signal will 
continue, unidirectionally, down the axon to the terminal buttons (Kandel et al 132).  Intensity of 
a nerve impulse is not determined by the magnitude of the electrical charge sent down the axon, 
as one might think.  This impulse is consistent in magnitude; rather, more or less intense 
messages are delivered by a modulation in the rapidity and sequence of impulses. 
The physiology of a firing event, called an action potential, is determined by electrical 
gradients within the cell.  A neuron changes the flux of charged particles, or ions, in and out of 
itself.  Signals that affect the neuron do so by altering the ratio of different ions (sodium and 
potassium) within or without the cell.  These incoming signals are input predominantly via other 
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neurons, whose terminal buttons are attached to the various parts of the head of the neuron, either 
the long spindly dendrites or the soma itself.  The signals could also come from any of myriad 
sensory cells in the body, such as those in the eyes, ears, nose, or tongue as well as the more 
unfamiliar sensors, such as those that monitor blood pressure by measuring the expansion of 
blood vessels (Kandel et al 125).   
The signals that input to a neuron are of two basic types: inhibitory and stimulatory.  
These are straightforward, inhibitory signals make an action potential less likely, stimulatory 
signals make an action potential more likely.  Both of these effects are achieved by altering the 
electric ion gradient of the neuron appropriately (Kandel et al 125).  All of this is happening in 
the dendrites, soma, and axon hillock.  The most important site for the integration of the signals 
is the axon hillock, because if the electric gradient in this place reaches a certain level the cell 
will react.  The sites which inhibitory and stimulatory inputs bind to the neuron are not random, 
however.  Stimulatory inputs tend to be found on the dendrites and the parts of the soma farther 
away from the axon hillock.  Inhibitory inputs tend to be found very near the axon hillock.  This 
distribution is quite significant, because it means that one or very few inhibitory signals can 
block the effect of very many stimulatory effects.  This result largely has to do with the 
geometric fact that the effect any input has diminishes proportional to the square of the distance 
from the input.   
Once the electric level, or potential (also called voltage), in the axon hillock reaches a 
certain point (roughly -30 millivolts in human neurons) the cell reacts, causing a chain reaction 
to cascade down the axon. This cascade unidirectionally elevates the electric gradient all the way 
down the axon.  This reaction is capable of causing muscle contraction, organic chemical release 
into the blood, or influence of other neurons.  The electric potential which the axon hillock must 
experience in order to cause an action potential to cascade down the axon is termed the threshold 
of the neuron.  Here is the concept of a threshold within the model of neuron functioning: a 
Spring - 37 - 
 
 
certain electric potential must be reached in the axon hillock before a certain action can happen.  
This action either happens or it doesn’t, and it does not occur with more or less intensity (as 
mentioned earlier).   
The term threshold is appropriate to the model because the term is governing an event 
that is all or nothing.  All of the thousands of inputs a neuron has into whether or not it fires are 
reduced into exactly a yes/no response.  The voltage existent in the axon hillock at which a 
neuron produces an action potential propagating from the axon hillock to the terminal buttons 
neuroscientists have termed the threshold of that neuron (Kandel et al 132).  This threshold is 
somewhat consistent among neurons of the same type, but it certainly might change within the 
cell over time due to changes in certain physiological and environmental features. Furthermore, 
the neurons of different animal species will fire at different threshold levels.  This is similar to 
the way in which we might conceptualize human thresholds. Different humans at different points 
in their lives will require different environmental support in order to flourish, for example a child 
requires a higher percentage of protein although a lower overall calorie count and her ranges of 
healthy vital signs will be different than her adult self (M Spring).    In neuroscience, while the 
specific voltage varies, the general form remains consistent across all neurons.  In regards to 
evaluation of justice, the form of capabilities, assessed with thresholds, may be the general form 
although the specific threshold levels vary.   
To reiterate, when the neuron’s threshold is crossed, only then, and not until then, a 
significant and real change comes about in the neuron.  The fact that thresholds model an all or 
nothing, binary event is worth belaboring, since that is the pertinent analogy to Nussbaum’s use 
of thresholds in her capabilities approach.  At least, this is the picture that Nussbaum would like 
to draw.  Whether thresholds of human capabilities are actually like the conception of thresholds 
in neurons or like the conception of the difference between blue and green is a very important 
question.  In any case, an external understanding of the meaning of “threshold” is important 
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since Nussbaum does not indicate any in-depth meaning of her own, even though much of her 
approach relies on the concept.   
Consider this metaphor between neurons and capabilities.  In neurons it is often the case 
that that a few inhibitors can prevent a threshold from obtaining, even in the presence of many 
stimulatory factors.  Neurologically, this is most generally due to the arrangement of the different 
connections to the soma of the neuron, as noted earlier.  We notice this same disparity, perhaps 
by coincidence, in our consideration of capabilities.  For example, even if the myriad entities 
required for public sanitation, transportation, and commerce are in place, if a person has the 
physical health and mental abilities and desires to affiliate with others, given all these positive 
inputs, the strong threat of wanton ethnic violence would still likely force this human to remain 
indoors and cause the relevant capabilities not to obtain.  That is, there is a disparity in influence 
between positive, i.e. stimulatory, and negative, i.e. inhibitory, effects.  In this case the negative 
effects are more powerful.  Regardless, this example highlights the interconnectedness of the 
various capabilities.  It is certainly the case that a high level of capability in one area often 
facilitates a higher level in other capabilities.  Likewise, an absence of a capability can greatly 
inhibit the development of other capabilities.  For this reason, one might think of the capabilities 
each as individual entities, like neurons, but each connected to every other capability in complex 
ways.  The metaphor is not nearly perfect, since a capability obtaining in a person often 
stimulates but almost never inhibits other capabilities, which is not the case in neurons.  The 
metaphor is strong, however, in emphasizing the complicated interactivity between the different 
capabilities.  While they are each important in their own right, they are also often vital to each 
other. 
With this understanding of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, its use of the concept of 
thresholds, and the concept of threshold itself we are prepared to investigate the merits of the 
approach.  The discussions of what flourishing is, what is flourishing (persons or humans), who 
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is flourishing (which nations), and how flourishing is assessed (thresholds) from this section will 
all be critiqued in the following.   
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Section III 
There are several tensions set up within Nussbaum’s capabilities approach which threaten 
to rend the approach apart.  Nussbaum acknowledges in the preface to Women and Human 
Development that she is writing the book for a “broad interdisciplinary audience” and with the 
intent of “shaping public policy,” and therefore her philosophical arguments, though all present, 
are somewhat compressed (WHD xiii).  Given this, it is wise to first consult Frontiers of Justice 
for any theoretical updates or refinements, since it is the single main update to the capabilities 
approach. The approach is explicitly yet unfinished (FJ 414), though it is refined.  Even so, the 
intent of this section is not to nitpick points which would benefit from a fuller discussion 
potentially forthcoming, but rather to identify areas that raise serious questions within 
Nussbaum’s approach.   
These inquisitions will be in the areas of paternalism, multiple realizability, the cross 
cultural nature of thresholds, the implications of the conflation of human and person, the fair 
expenditure of a nation’s resources, the quantification of a qualitative continuum by the use of 
threshold, and ideas of tragedy.  As thresholds will prove inadequate, the idea of simply 
capabilities as valuable will also be considered, so as to not throw out the baby with the 
bathwater.  Some alternatives to assessment of capabilities by thresholds will also be considered, 
namely comparison by inequalities rather than binaries and fair distribution rather than 
consideration of individuals’ thresholds.   
One possible critique is that, despite all the airs that she puts on, Nussbaum’s account is, 
in fact, paternalistic.  The problem with paternalism is the distinction between convincing 
someone of the truth and commanding someone of the truth.  The capabilities approach could be 
paternalistic because, as a universal approach requiring the respect for persons as ends and such 
things, the approach does enforce values and processes upon the population unilaterally.  
Alternatively, one might be worried that the approach allows a freedom to specify manners of 
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achieving a flourishing citizenry, but the goal is doggedly fixed in any case.  In another possible 
angle, one might object that in a democracy, since the majority automatically gets some 
command over the minority, some citizens (the minority) will always be forced to bend to the 
will of the majority and therefore suffer some injustice, whether it is paternalism or some other.  
Two of the critiques, about the paternalism of any universal ethic and the tyranny of the majority, 
are not problems specific to Nussbaum’s approach but of the contractualist tradition and liberal 
democracy more generally.  Such a broad critique shall not be undertaken here.  The other 
concern is not really one of paternalism because it involves the flexibility of the thresholds that 
Nussbaum must specify; she intends the thresholds to be flexible enough to tolerate cultural 
diversity yet firm enough to actually require something of citizens and governments.   
This attempt is embodied in Nussbaum’s term multiple realizability, which may have one 
of three consequences along a sequence worthy of Goldielocks: too tight, too loose, or just right.  
If thresholds may in fact only be specified very tightly, there is no real freedom to the distinct 
groups specifying the approach for themselves because Nussbaum’s capabilities and the 
specification of their thresholds must hold strongly so over everyone. This rigidity does not 
allow distinct groups the ability to significantly specify the capabilities’ thresholds and in so 
doing removes the variable, culture-sensitive character of the approach.  This conclusion is 
obviously contrary to the intent of Nussbaum’s approach.   
Another possibility is that the thresholds are to be specified loosely.  The level of what is 
appropriate to be considered human flourishing is allowed to vary between nations, and thus 
between cultures.  Thresholds vary over time within a nation, as well.  And the compositions of 
nations and cultures are not constant either, with individuals moving in and out of them, nor is 
there a rigid definition of what delineates a specific culture.  If the concept of multiple 
realizability is intended to allow threshold specifications to vary, they may vary across all of 
these variables, both between them presently and within one instance over time.  This variation 
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sneaks in with the first bit of allowed variation and grow exponentially the more loosely the 
threshold is specified.  Such variation seems to be at odds with a universal approach, although it 
allows the cultural variety that Nussbaum prizes.  However, Nussbaum explicitly asserts the 
universality of her claim, so her claim of multiple realizability cannot be removing this.  She also 
emphasizes that hers is a claim with global scope, as opposed to the national scope of her 
predecessors.  In order to maintain the allowance for cultural variety, a supporter might claim 
that these variations are only able to occur within a certain limit.  There is a broader, general 
sphere of specification and these variations are allowed to occur within it, but that variation is 
circumscribed within the acceptable levels.   
A critic might ask what these acceptable levels are, and from where they are generated, 
and why all of this extra complication of smaller spheres exists if the acceptable levels were just 
specified so cleanly.  Nussbaum never lays down such broad guidelines, except once with 
reference to education, and then parenthetically (FJ 180). Perhaps the answer is that one of the 
capabilities, practical reason, requires each flourishing person to be active in her life plan and 
have some control of her political situation.  Even though it is doubtful she really does, given all 
of the obstacles in modern life and all of the politicians that make important decisions for the 
citizens of their country.  These smaller spheres may be of practical political significance, since 
certainly only states currently have the power to enforce laws.  But if there is a broader, all 
encompassing sphere, this is ethically what we are concerned with; the rest are political 
mechanisms that, while practically vital, are of little ethical importance. 
These two sides of the coin leave little room for a happy medium.  At the heart of this 
concern is Nussbaum’s own lack of specificity of threshold levels.  This silence on the issue may 
be out of respect for her readers and their governments to make their own conclusions on the 
subject, but she may also be silent because she actually cannot identify a threshold at which a 
qualitative change comes about in a human and is sufficiently general and variable.  An attempt 
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at specifying a threshold should help us in this question.  There are reasonably well established 
standards for determining whether or not a human is in good health, so let us consider 
Nussbaum’s second capability, bodily health.  This is not to be conflated with mental health, 
which would be under other capabilities.  Mental well being certainly may influence bodily 
health, and while that interaction emphasizes the interconnectedness of the capabilities it will 
confuse our attempts here.   
To measure health, a doctor might measure various vital signs such as temperature, blood 
pressure, pulse, respiratory rate, height, and weight (M Spring).  Nussbaum adds to this a 
consideration as to whether the person has access to control over reproduction, such as 
contraception (FoJ 76).  All of these vitals may vary significantly, for example “healthy” adult 
pulse rates fall between 60-100 beats per minute, although some marathon runners have resting 
pulses as low as 45 and are still considered healthy (M Spring).  While this range is quite wide 
between individuals, the range does not vary at all in between cultures, races, or ethnicities.  
What is measured may vary between cultures may change, for example an acupuncturist may not 
care about pulse in the same way that a Western doctor does.  That fact does not change or 
invalidate the Western doctor’s measurements, nor do the doctor’s invalidate the acupuncturist’s.  
Likewise, malnourished African children may be treated much differently than they would were 
they in the US.  This difference is due to a lack of means, however, not because the African 
children have a different threshold of what it is to be malnourished.  They’re just all 
malnourished and there is not much their governments can do about it (M Spring).   
These differences in assessment technique and achievement may be what Nussbaum is 
talking about with multiple realizability.  If she is talking about the actual standards of health 
varying between countries, she is at odds with the medical community.  If she is only considering 
that there are different ways to assess health, her concept is thin and obvious.  For example, if I 
measure a ruler in inches and my friend measures it in centimeters, neither of us are wrong about 
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the length of the ruler.  We just have different ways of assessing it; likewise with the doctor and 
the acupuncturist neither is wrong.  And presumably what we care about is the length of the 
ruler, i.e. the substance of the capabilities and what a human can be, not the system by which we 
measure that achievement.   
Whether or not Nussbaum’s ethic is multiply realizable or universal does not bear on its 
consistency, anyway.  However, that is not the case for all of the tensions within the capabilities 
approach.  The idea that human beings qua humans have innate properties, virtue, and dignity is 
an idea that Nussbaum is getting from Aristotle.  Thus the “list of central human capabilities” 
(WHD 5), descending from this tradition, is a list that is likely meant to apply to all humans, 
simply due to the fact of being human.  But Nussbaum’s principle of each “[human’s]”1 
capability is “based” on her principle inherited from Kant, her principle of each person as an end.  
Kant formulated this idea in the context of rational wills, not persons or humans.  Rational wills 
include God, persons, and angels, basically.  Rawls, like Kant, presumes that the property of 
citizens that is of primary importance is their rationality.  These citizens may be persons, and 
have certain concerns for that reason, but the citizen must be rational in order to enter into the 
deliberations at the Original Position.   
It is not clear that rational wills, Kant’s topic, are entitled to or inherently any of the 
things that human beings are, such as capable of bodily integrity, since rational wills have no 
bodies.  Nor is it clear whether rational wills include humans, persons, both, or neither.  It is 
clear that the term is not exactly interchangeable with either human or person.  As personhood 
relies more on mental properties than humanity, it is reasonable that person is better translation 
for rational will.  The tension between the classifications is mitigated by the fact that most 
rational wills in our world are also humans and also persons, and so seem to have the properties 
of all sets.  This convergence also hides the fact that Nussbaum conflates the two terms human 
 
1 For her referents to be consistent, by “person’s capability” Nussbaum must actually have “human” in mind. 
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and person, basing some of her approach on the properties of humans and some on the properties 
of persons.  But it is possible that the assumptions Nussbaum makes of capabilities via humanity 
yet dignity and respect via rationality are incompatible with any entity that is not a rational 
human person.  This limits the scope of Nussbaum’s approach, perhaps to somewhat healthy 
adult human beings, which would be narrower than she would like. 
Furthermore, some utilitarians might object to Nussbaum’s approach because it seems to 
require that a society devotes all its resources to bringing those who are below threshold above it 
in all areas to the exclusion of using the resources for everyone else in the society.  The objector 
could proceed to claim that this is a waste of resources or unfair to those citizens who are above 
the threshold.  The advocate of the capabilities approach agrees about the importance of the 
individual under threshold, that is indeed one of the major motivations behind the approach.  She 
would simply disagree that the expenditure of resources is a waste; rather, it is the duty of the 
government to ensure the flourishing of each of its citizens because, as citizens and humans, they 
are entitled to develop their capabilities (WHD 83).   
The actual cost depends on where Nussbaum intends to locate the threshold of various 
capabilities, which is a recurring deficiency in the approach.  Also the monetary and time cost of 
securing that threshold for each person is uncertain.  This concern is more a practical rather than 
philosophical matter, but philosophers recently have commented on it, and the UN makes reports 
on the cost of eradicating poverty.  If poverty is any sort of rough estimation of capability 
deprivation, the estimations are encouraging.  The cost may be much less than many Westerners 
know or would like to believe; providing food, water, sanitation, basic medicine and education 
might cost $60 billion $US per year for fifteen years (as of 2000).  This is less than the United 
States spends annually on tobacco and alcohol (Singer 184).  The UN’s more demanding 
estimate from the same time period called for a mere 0.7% of the developed world’s income over 
that time to solve the problem (Singer 180).  These facts make the consistency of the capabilities 
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approach more palatable, but are irrelevant to the consistency of the capabilities approach in 
itself.  It remains consistent because of the emphasis on and importance of the individual.   
 The conceptualization of capabilities as being measured by thresholds has to do with 
important features of the approach that are subject to investigation.  Where the threshold is 
crossed indicates an intuitive qualitative difference between a person whose life is dignified and 
a person whose life is seriously lacking.  The life is sufficiently lacking to justify terming it not 
fully or truly human.  We can call where this qualitative change occurs the threshold of 
flourishing; here a change in a human’s condition can be converted into a binary output, either 
flourishing or not.  A simple count of citizens who are above the threshold in all areas produces a 
rudimentary quantification of the qualitative well-being of the citizens in a region.  Such 
quantification is very useful, probably necessary, for political or goal-setting purposes, but may 
not actually be the best way of conceptualizing humans or persons.   
 Whether this quantification is a side effect of the nature of what is important about 
capabilities or whether the nature of capabilities is a side effect of a necessity for quantification 
is not clear.  It is possible that the rhetorical requirements of writing in political philosophy have 
forced any theory to be quantifiable in order to have any influence on political bodies.  Thus any 
theory hoping to carry weight in that field will have to force itself to be quantifiable, whether or 
not it is best for the view.  The question this paper is addressing is whether or not the concept of 
threshold is the best by which to measure capabilities within the capabilities approach, not 
whether threshold is the best measure by which to purvey capabilities to political bodies.  It 
might be hoped that both the best measure of capabilities per se and capabilities vis-à-vis 
political bodies will be the same measure.  But these goals cannot be presumed to have the same 
measure.   
 Nussbaum’s move to identify which capabilities are central to human functioning, and 
thus which capabilities are to be measured and concern us in a normative theory, is vital if the 
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capabilities approach on the whole is to succeed. However, it is not clear that Nussbaum 
correctly identifies the ten capabilities.  The selection of which capabilities are central may be 
subject to much of the same critique as where to place the threshold on each one.  The 
capabilities are supposedly centrally human and exert a freestanding moral claim that they ought 
to be developed (WHD 83), but this is not obvious and Nussbaum does not provide real support 
for it.  They are selected, however carefully, by humans from the range of human capabilities as 
to be the ones that might be most useful in thinking about how to plan our lives.  Nussbaum is 
explicit in her rejection of any teleological, religious, or otherwise metaphysical basis for her 
selection of these capabilities and the threshold to which they should be developed (WHD 83). In 
this case, the capabilities seem baseless, although they are selected with motivations of political 
expediency supposedly in order to allow all comprehensive doctrine to assent to the approach’s 
assertions.  However, whether they are endorsable by every reasonable comprehensive doctrine, 
or just many, or some, is questionable.  Certainly any comprehensive doctrine that rejects any of 
Nussbaum’s basic tenets could never agree to an overlapping consensus consisting of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities.   
 In addition to introducing a list of capabilities, she needs to introduce the concept of 
assessing each to be able to tell whether or not the individual in question has or has not crossed a 
certain threshold.  This list of capabilities may be more useful than the technique used to 
measure it, or visa versa.  While threshold is closely associated with capabilities the two are 
distinct and separable.  Nussbaum already writes of many of her capabilities as requiring a fair 
distribution, and in some cases strict equality, in order to be just, anyway (FJ 292).  Soon, we 
shall consider whether or not this is a more appropriate measure of the capabilities as a whole. 
 Thresholds measure a distinct qualitative break on the continuum of improvements in 
well-being.  Normally, being a little better off is a little better.  This concept might be called 
gradualism.  The capabilities approach bucks this trend, and claims that there is actually only one 
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point at which any better is better at all.  With the capabilities approach, there is for each 
individual a specific level that makes a tenacious moral claim, which takes priority over 
improvements to that person in other capabilities and in other people.  But insofar as the 
approach recognizes that thresholds may vary along something, and that human’s actual 
capabilities may vary along something, this thing is a continuum.  There are not discrete quanta 
of well-being, there is a gradient scale.  The capabilities approach claims that this continuum 
contains a level at which there is a qualitative difference between what is below it and what is 
above it.  However it is not patently clear that the threshold Nussbaum is conceptualizing is a 
distinction that already exists within the continuum of human well-being and she is identifying it, 
or, rather, if she is arbitrarily imposing a break along a continuum on which no such break exists.  
To help with this question, it may be helpful to reconsider the analogy with colors, which exist 
on a perfect continuum along the wavelengths of visible light.  
 At some point, blue light becomes green light.  The only difference is that green light is 
slightly lower in energy; there is no qualitative difference in the composition of the energy.  The 
distinction between blue light and green light is a human distinction, and a qualitative distinction 
between two aspects that are not qualitatively different.  One could say that the light does not 
care one iota whether we call it blue or green.  There is also not a clear point at which green light 
becomes blue, in other words there is an area that is indeterminate.  These observations make the 
human distinction seem meek or frail compared to the “real” world.     
 The meekness of our human distinction does not mean, however, that we cannot 
distinguish between the two colors in the majority of cases nor that the distinction is not 
profoundly useful to us.  Artists, interior designers, and many people who get dressed in the 
morning make use of the relationships between colors.  There is even a somewhat complex 
system of classification of complementary colors, warm colors, and soft colors, as well as the 
interactions and uses of such classifications with each other and the human psyche.  Furthermore, 
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even optical science makes some distinctions between classes of radiation, of which visible light 
is one.  These distinctions between types, such as ultraviolet, visible, or microwaves, are useful 
because each type possesses certain distinct qualities when interacting with the physical world, 
even though they exist on a perfect continuum with no fundamental distinction between them.  
When crossing some human imposed, arbitrary, but well-reasoned threshold, visible light 
becomes infrared (for this example when we can no longer see it).   
 These reflections provide hope that the capabilities approach is not ill-advised in 
imposing a similar sort of threshold upon the continuum of human well-being.  There may be no 
fundamental, indisputable distinction on which to attribute the threshold level, but the threshold 
conception may yet prove profoundly useful in planning or developing our lives.  The analogy is 
not perfect, of course.  With light we can rely on simple observation.  We see blue or green, it 
does not require judgments as does judging how healthy someone is.  Even the simple 
observation that x-rays pass through certain materials that visible light does not aids in 
maintaining these distinctions.  These observations can be measured (objectively) with numbers 
in a way that human well-being certainly cannot.  The capabilities approach helps us assess well-
being by itemizing the components of it into more manageable parts.  However, the basis upon 
which we identify the level at which the threshold is crossed is not so clear.  Unlike the threshold 
where ice becomes water, the threshold of human capabilities is assigned by humans.  This fact 
makes capabilities’ thresholds more difficult to determine, if not impossible.  Since there is no 
clear answer as to where these human thresholds occur, the idea that a little more is a little better, 
no matter at what level of capability, remains more plausible. 
 There are further critiques of identifying thresholds.  Additionally, some might object that 
these considerations of flourishing and tragedy are not sufficient to adequately discuss 
capabilities because different people disagree about whether or not even canonically tragic or 
flourishing characters are either. Even given that they are tragic or flourishing there is often 
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disagreement about the important characteristics that identify them as so.  What we might do is 
take the cases that a majority of citizens consider to be tragic.  This tactic would make the 
opinions of a minority of citizens irrelevant, though, which seems to be against the spirit of 
Nussbaum’s approach; the spirit that each individual is of primary importance.  Again, there is a 
problem of process in identifying threshold.  It is not as though we could do it if we had the 
information.  These flaws indicate the conclusion that thresholds cannot be sufficiently specified. 
 It may be that the whole concept of threshold is not the best measure of human capability, 
in regards to justice or anything.  Nor is it necessary; all of the math that economists and 
politicians would like to do using the binary output of thresholds can actually be done using 
inequalities – A is overall more capable than B, &c.  Furthermore, what may be fair is relatively 
little inequality among citizens in regards to the capabilities, not that they all be above a certain 
level of capability.  This view would be much closer to Rawls’s view of justice as fairness.  This 
measure would still measure the modern world as incredibly unfair, since certain people have 
phenomenally greater capabilities than others.  In considering reduction of inequality as 
important it ought to be noted that there are sufficient material resources in the world that 
everyone being roughly equal is not equivalent to no one flourishing; this is motioned at by the 
cost estimates of eliminated poverty indicated above.  It would also still promote redistribution 
of wealth, and improving the condition of women, both of which Nussbaum favors.  A 
capabilities approach addressing inequality rather than threshold would also alleviate the horribly 
sticky situation of actually specifying where citizens cross the threshold.  We may have good 
reason to substitute Nussbaum’s affinity to threshold with a concept based on reduction of 
inequality, or a fair distribution.  In addition, inequality is a more timeless and automatically 
adjusting goal, as opposed to Nussbaum’s own concession that the threshold levels she is 
envisioning will vary somewhat over time, more or less significantly dependant on the capability 
in question (WHD 77, see footnote 81 also).   
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We have reason for maintaining her list of capabilities and discarding her standard of 
assessment (thresholds).  First, Nussbaum presents criteria for us to decide which capabilities are 
central to human functioning, albeit an imperfect and subjective one: that of reflection upon both 
tragic and good human lives and observing what capabilities are key to that distinction.  The 
capabilities are yet another attempt in the history of philosophy at identifying first principles that 
are common between all of us from which one may derive normative principles.  Nussbaum’s 
imperfect approaches may be sufficient for identifying the broad topics which we ought to care 
about even though it seems clear that they are too vague for us to be able to identify thresholds.  
It is at least easier to argue for capabilities themselves than for thresholds; Nussbaum’s books as 
a whole demonstrate this.  Also, if the capabilities approach, such as supported by Sen as well, is 
to be made feasible, some list of which capabilities are to be considered must be posited at some 
point.  And there seems to be reason within welfare economics to pursue this approach.  For this 
reason Nussbaum’s list can at least been seen as somewhere from which to start.  In this way the 
capabilities approach provides an alternative to the traditional conception in the social contract 
tradition in which the only dependable feature of people is that they will act in accordance to 
rational self interest.  Nussbaum is aware that she is proposing an approach outside the norm in 
this manner (FJ 408-409).  Additionally, if the capabilities are to be considered they need not be 
considered by reference to thresholds.  There are viable alternatives for assessing the capabilities, 
as mentioned above, such as by inequalities and/or fair distributions.     
Several problems have been identified with the capabilities approach, although it has 
withstood some tests.  It has been demonstrated that the approach is not paternalistic, nor would 
it require an unfair or unjustified use of resources by a government.  There are continuums, 
similar to that of human well-being, to which thresholds have been usefully applied by people.  
And the capabilities themselves seem plausible as something to care about in regards to 
normative theories.  Most of the critiques of the approach that involved the concept of thresholds 
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were more damaging.  Nussbaum’s concept of multiple realizability does not appear to be a 
substantive feature of the approach, but rather a political tool.  This failure is because, for 
measurable capabilities like health at least, the threshold of what is considered acceptable does 
not in fact vary across cultures any more than it does between humans within a culture.  
Nussbaum conflates the terms “human” and “person,” which is confusing in general and limits 
the scope of her approach to the intersection of the two terms.  Unfortunately, she applies her 
approach to the union of the two terms.  Due to the weakness of any attempt to specify 
thresholds, with their characteristic binary output, gradualism and assessment via absolute 
inequalities seem more attractive as assessments of capabilities.   
There is one important feature of citizens that Nussbaum is capturing in her capabilities 
approach.  Other social contract theories limit their concept of citizens to merely rational entities, 
and attempt to derive their principles from this alone.  This oversimplification does indeed cause 
these views the problems that Nussbaum points out, even if she has not completely succeeded in 
offering the alternative that she had hoped.  The capabilities approach takes a much more 
complex, and accurate, view of citizens.  While citizens are rational, they are not always.  They 
are emotional, imaginative, social, and material.  Any view, political or philosophical, that is 
going to accurately handle a topic has to start with an accurate conception of it.  Additionally, if 
the topic is persons, or humans, that should be made clear.  But historically, at least recently, 
persons have been reduced to something they are not – purely rational – in considerations of us.  
Although it will be more complex to handle fully everything that a person is, that cannot be 
avoided.  We are complex entities, and should be handled as such.   
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Appendix i  
the 2000 version of the list of central human capabilities 
Additions to the list featured in Frontiers of Justice are in brackets [].  Items which were removed 
from this version are underlined.  Rearrangements are indicated by stars *, **. 
 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or 
before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; being adequately 
nourished; to have adequate shelter.  
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries 
treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child 
sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, think, and 
reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and 
scientific training.  Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and 
producing self-expressive works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and 
so forth.  Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression 
with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise.  Being able to 
search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way.  Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those 
who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve,  to experience 
longing, gratitude, and justified anger.  Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear 
or anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect.  (Supporting this capability means 
supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for liberty of conscience 
[and religious observance].)  
7. Affiliation. A.  Being able to live [with]for and towards others, to recognize and show concern 
for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the 
situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both 
justice and friendship.  (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and 
nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political 
speech).    
B.  Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.  This entails, at a minimum, protections 
against [provisions of non-]discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, *religion, 
caste, ethnicity, or national origin*.  **In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising 
practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other 
workers. ** [(2006 version puts this sentence in #10)]  
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the 
world of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
10. Control over one's environment. A. Political: being able to participate effectively in political 
choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech 
and association.  
B. Material: Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in 
terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the 
right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted 
search and seizure.  ** (WHD 78-80) 
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